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ARTICLES

Confrontation and Hearsay Issues in
Federal Court Terrorism Prosecutions
of Gitmo Detainees
MOUSSAOUI AND PARACHA AS HARBINGERS?

*

Norman Abrams†
In tribute to Professor Margaret A. Berger
I.

INTRODUCTION

Professor Margaret Berger is best known as a
distinguished Evidence scholar on the subject of expert
testimony. Her work includes, however, an important paper on
the Confrontation Clause, published in 1992, titled, The
Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal
for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model,1 which was one of the
earliest articles to foreshadow Justice Scalia’s majority opinion
in the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Crawford v.
Washington.2
I dedicate this paper as a tribute to Margaret’s oeuvre
on evidence and in celebration of that article, noting that she
presciently anticipated the general change of direction by the
Court, although Crawford took a different, related doctrinal

*

© 2010 Norman Abrams. All rights reserved.
Professor of Law Emeritus and Acting Chancellor Emeritus, UCLA
1
76 MINN. L. REV. 557 (1992).
2
541 U.S. 36 (2004). Scholarly works cited by Justice Scalia in Crawford
include AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 125-31
(1997) and Richard Friedman, Essay, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles,
86 GEO. L. J. 1011 (1998). Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61; see also Benjamin E. Rosenberg,
The Future of Codefendant Confessions, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 516 (2000).
†
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approach to the application and scope of the Confrontation
Clause.
This paper will examine the implications of the 2004
Fourth Circuit compulsory process decision in United States v.
Moussaoui,3 and also refer to its 2008 Second Circuit progeny,
United States v. Paracha.4 It will use the doctrine of those
cases, considered in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Crawford and Davis v. Washington,5 as the basis for an exercise
to examine how certain types of confrontation and hearsay
issues might be analyzed in future terrorism prosecutions in
the federal courts—applications that neither Justice Scalia nor
Professor Berger may have anticipated.
II.

CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON AND PROFESSOR BERGER’S
PROPOSAL

It is, of course, familiar stuff to evidence scholars that
Crawford dramatically shifted the Court’s approach to the
Confrontation Clause, holding that “[t]estimonial statements of
witnesses absent from trial” are admissible “only where the
declarant is unavailable and only where the defendant has had
a prior opportunity to cross-examine [the witness].”6 The key to
this new doctrinal development is the notion of testimonial
statements, which Justice Scalia, relying on and applying the
history behind the Confrontation Clause, described in the
following terms:
An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers
bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark
to an acquaintance does not. The constitutional text, like the history
underlying the common-law right of confrontation, thus reflects an
especially acute concern with a specific type of out-of-court
statement.
Various formulations of this core class of “testimonial” statements
exist, [e.g.]: “ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—
that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior
testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar
pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be
used prosecutorially” . . . . These formulations all share a common
3

382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 931 (2005).
313 F. App’x. 347 (2d Cir. 2008). The circuit opinion, which was not
certified for publication, treats the relevant issues summarily. For a fuller treatment,
see the district court opinion, United States v. Paracha, No. 03-CR-1197(SHS), 2006
WL 12768 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2006).
5
547 U.S. 813 (2006).
6
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59.
4
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nucleus and then define the Clause’s coverage at various levels of
abstraction around it . . . .
Statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations
are also testimonial under even a narrow standard. Police
interrogations bear a striking resemblance to examinations by
justices of the peace in England. The statements are not sworn
testimony, but the absence of oath was not dispositive.7

Twelve years before Crawford was decided, Professor Berger
advocated a related approach:
Hearsay statements procured by agents of the prosecution or police
should therefore stand on a different footing than hearsay created
without government intrusion. The Confrontation Clause should bar
hearsay statements elicited by governmental agents unless the
declarant is produced at trial or unless special procedures [which she
later describes] . . . are followed.8

Both approaches would apply the Confrontation Clause to
hearsay statements obtained by governmental agents for use at
trial. The main difference appears to be that Justice Scalia
uses a doctrinal category, “testimonial statements,” to
characterize the type of hearsay covered by the Confrontation
Clause while the emphasis under Professor Berger’s proposal is
on the fact that the statement was procured by government
agents and on government behavior. Rather than relying on a
formulaic approach, she proposes one that would focus on the
circumstances of the particular case and identify whether
inappropriate forms of prosecutorial behavior were involved:
Inter alia, she recommends that contemporaneous recordings
be used in appropriate cases to ensure that the prosecutor or
police did not pressure, induce, or manipulate the declarant
into making the statement. She views the Confrontation
Clause as a limitation on government action, as a way of
keeping “the overwhelming prosecutorial powers of the
government in check.”9
Use of the formulaic approach led Justice Scalia in
Davis v. Washington to add a qualification to the definition of
“testimonial,” and a key question for this paper is how broadly
the Davis doctrine is to be interpreted. The very use of the
definitional term, “testimonial,” thus carries with it
7

Id. at 51-52 (quoting Brief of Petitioner at 23, Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410)).
8
Berger, supra note 1, at 561-62.
9
Id. at 562.
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substantive implications. It is not clear whether Professor
Berger would recognize a similar categorical limitation since
governmental action would still be involved even in situations
excluded from the coverage of the Confrontation Clause under
the Scalia approach in Davis. If not, her approach would sweep
more broadly than Justice Scalia’s and might bring more
statements under the protection of the confrontation mantle.
III.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF DAVIS V. WASHINGTON

As noted above, Crawford ruled that the introduction
into evidence by the prosecution of out-of-court statements that
are testimonial, where the declarant is unavailable and the
statements had not been subject to prior cross-examination,
violates the Confrontation Clause. Davis v. Washington
qualified Crawford by treating as nontestimonial certain types
of statements elicited by police questioning.10 Recall that in
describing the category of testimonial statements, Justice
Scalia in Crawford stated: “Statements taken by police officers
in the course of interrogations are . . . testimonial under even a
narrow standard.”11 We learn, however, from Justice Scalia’s
opinion in Davis v. Washington about statements obtained
through police questioning that are nontestimonial:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to
meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing
emergency, and the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.
....
. . . When we said in Crawford . . . that “interrogations by law
enforcement officers fall squarely within [the] class” of testimonial
hearsay, we had immediately in mind (for that was the case before
us) interrogations solely directed at establishing the facts of a past
crime, in order to identify (or provide evidence to convict) the
perpetrator. The product of such interrogation, whether reduced to a
writing signed by the declarant or embedded in the memory (and
perhaps notes) of the interrogating officer, is testimonial. . . . A 911
call, on the other hand, and at least the initial interrogation
conducted in connection with a 911 call, is ordinarily not designed
10
11

Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
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primarily to “establis[h] or prov[e]” some past fact, but to describe
current circumstances requiring police assistance.12

In Davis, Justice Scalia drew a distinction that had not
surfaced in Crawford—between testimonial and nontestimonial
statements that result from police interrogation. The
distinction rests principally on what was “the primary purpose
of the interrogation.”13 If the interrogation is “solely directed at
establishing the facts of a past crime, in order to . . . provide
evidence to convict . . . the perpetrator,” it is testimonial.14 If its
primary purpose was “to meet an ongoing emergency,” or was
“designed primarily . . . to describe current circumstances
requiring police assistance,” it is non-testimonial.15
As we shall see further along in this paper, Crawford
and Davis combined with Moussaoui and Paracha provide the
basis for a line of argument that might be used to address
confrontation concerns that would arise when the government
tries to offer into evidence the results of the interrogation of
suspected terrorists.
IV.

THE DOCTRINE OF UNITED STATES V. MOUSSAOUI AND
UNITED STATES V. PARACHA

A.

Compulsory Process/Classified Information Issues

Zacarias Moussaoui was indicted for a series of
terrorism offenses including involvement in the conspiracy that
led to the horrific acts on September 11, 2001. The 2004
decision of the Fourth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals in United
States v. Moussaoui,16 the final direct review opinion among
numerous Moussaoui decisions in the course of this
prosecution,
addressed
compulsory
process-classified
information issues in the case.
United States v. Paracha17 involved similar issues,
though the charges in that case were based on identification
document fraud and providing material support to al Qaeda in
aid of terrorism. In Paracha, the district court relied heavily on
12

Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 826-27 (citations omitted).
Id. at 822.
14
Id. at 826.
15
Id. at 827-28.
16
382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 931 (2005). The opinion
in volume 382 was a revised version of an earlier opinion, 365 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004).
17
No. 03-CR-1197(SHS), 2006 WL 12768 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2006).
13
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the Moussaoui opinion, and the circuit court summarily
affirmed the lower court decision.18 The significance of these
two Paracha opinions is not what they add substantively
(though they do add slightly to the earlier Moussaoui case), but
rather the fact that they are subsequent decisions that appear
to indicate that, at least in a terrorism prosecution context, the
Moussaoui doctrine that we examine in this paper is not “a
derelict on the waters of the law.”19
The
Moussaoui
Fourth
Circuit
decision,
by
happenstance, was handed down immediately after the
Supreme Court issued its opinion in Crawford v. Washington.
Accordingly, while Crawford is mentioned twice in Moussaoui,20
the references are brief. Neither the government’s nor the
defendant’s brief in Moussaoui mentioned Crawford (since both
briefs were prepared before the Crawford decision), although
they do address some confrontation issues.21 Moussaoui is
generally and correctly perceived as primarily involving, at a
constitutional level, compulsory process issues; it is not a
confrontation or hearsay decision. Yet, as discussed below,
because of the way the court formulated its opinion, arguments
regarding confrontation and hearsay issues in terrorism
prosecutions can be derived from the case.
At the outset, two aspects of the Moussaoui opinion
should be noted, which, while they make it more difficult to
determine its meaning, do not prevent us from digging into the
doctrine of the case. First, because the case involves classified
information, the opinion is heavily redacted so that particular
sentences are inconclusive and hard to decipher. (However,
somewhat surprisingly, one can reasonably guess at some of
the words that were deleted from the opinion.) Second, after
the Supreme Court denied certiorari review of the circuit
court’s opinion under consideration here, Moussaoui pleaded

18

United States v. Paracha, 313 F. App’x. 347, 351 (2d Cir. 2008).
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 332 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., joined by
Harlan, J. and Whittaker, J., dissenting). It should be kept in mind that Moussaoui is a
Fourth Circuit opinion, and that Circuit has had the reputation of being one of the
most conservative in the nation. See Neil A. Lewis, Obama’s Court Nominees Are Focus
of Speculation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2009, at A19 (suggesting that because of the large
number of potential appointments to that bench, President Obama has the possibility
of turning the conservative Circuit quickly around). The fact that Moussaoui was
followed by the Second Circuit in Paracha is therefore not without significance.
20
See Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 461, 481.
21
See Brief of Appellee at 81-84, Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (No. 03-4792); see
also Brief for the United States at 48-60, Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (No. 03-4792).
19
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guilty.22 The circuit court opinion had contemplated further
action in the district court: the judge was expected to apply the
approach mandated by the circuit majority to the substitutions,
but the guilty plea served, to an extent,23 to limit such action
and also served to insulate the circuit court opinion from
further direct review.
As it turned out, subsequently, Moussaoui attempted to
withdraw his plea of guilty and in January 2010, a different
circuit panel issued an opinion that revisited some of the
relevant issues. This new opinion did not, however, change the
essential conclusions of the first panel.24
An important part of Moussaoui’s defense had been to
show that he was not involved in the 9/11 conspiracy. One of
the important issues in the case revolved around Moussaoui’s
efforts to obtain testimony from three individuals, enemy
combatant witnesses (the “ECWs”) at the time allegedly in U.S.
custody abroad, who were alleged to be key al Qaeda members
involved in the 9/11 conspiracy.25 Moussaoui asserted that these
individuals could provide exculpatory testimony on his behalf—
that he had not been involved in the 9/11 conspiracy.26 At the
time, the government declined officially to acknowledge that
these men were in custody, assuming that they were only for
purposes of allowing the court to make a ruling whether to
issue a subpoena ad testificandum. The government refused, on
grounds of national security, to produce the ECWs in person or
to make them available so their depositions could be taken.27
In an effort to resolve the impasse thereby created, a
compromise was attempted by the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals—to prepare substitutions for the testimony of these
three witnesses. While the case did not directly bring into play
the Classified Information Procedures Act (“CIPA”),28 because
live witness testimony was at issue, both the district and
circuit courts relied heavily on the CIPA approach for dealing
with classified evidence that the government does not wish to
22

United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 271 (4th Cir. 2010).
See id. at 271-72, 276 (“The substituted statements of . . . several other
terrorists were . . . admitted as evidence during the sentencing proceedings.”).
24
See id. at 284-85. In considering Moussaoui’s attack on his conviction and
attempted withdrawal of his plea of guilty, the January 2010 opinion reiterated the
previous panel’s justifications for treating the substitutions as reliable. See id.
25
Id. at 271, 287.
26
Id. at 271.
27
See United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 456-57 (4th Cir. 2004).
28
See 18 U.S.C. APP. 3 §§ 1-16 (2006).
23
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produce because of concerns about the need for secrecy and
confidentiality.29 An important tool under CIPA for dealing with
such evidence is to fashion substitutions, usually summaries,
which do not disclose any of the information that the
government wishes to keep confidential, but provide a
defendant with enough evidence to enable him/her to make
his/her defenses.
The district court had concluded that the substitutions
that had been offered by the government did not and could not
adequately protect the defendant’s right to defend himself.30
Reversing the lower court on this point, the circuit panel
concluded that, with more work and participation by the
district judge and the parties in the preparation of the
substitutions, both the government’s national security interests
and the compulsory process and right-to-defend interests of the
defendant could be adequately protected.31
The substitutions approved in principal by the court had
unique features. They were summaries, but of what? The
witnesses had not given depositions. Rather, detailed
statements (1) from the putative three ECWs, labeled by the
court as A, B and C, had been obtained, apparently through
interrogation, by government agents seeking intelligence that
could be used in preventing future terrorist actions and
apprehending other terrorists.32 (We do not address in this
paper any issues arising out of claims that the statements at
issue might have been obtained by government agents or their
surrogates through interrogation involving torture or other
forms of coercion.)
The statements thus obtained from A, B, and C had
then been “recorded” in “highly classified” reports (2) which had
been prepared for “use in the military and intelligence
communities; they were not prepared with this litigation” in
mind.33
Portions of the reports were then “excerpted and set
forth in documents prepared for purposes of this litigation”34

29
30
31
32
33
34

See, e.g., Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 471-72, 476-77.
See Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 284.
Id.
Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 458.
See id. at 458 n.5.
Id.
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which were labeled summaries (3). The summaries were
provided to defense counsel35 who had security clearance.
Finally, the substitutions (4) to be offered into evidence
were prepared from the summaries. These largely consisted of
the summaries of statements that had been obtained over the
course of several months but were not identical to these
summaries since in preparing the substitutions, the
government had reorganized the information.36
It is apparent from the foregoing that there were
multiple levels of hearsay involved in the substitutions that
were being considered by the court, with A, B, and C being the
declarants at level 1, supra, and the declarants involved in the
preparation of the documents labeled as levels 2-4 being
unnamed government agents or employees.
The district court had “deemed the substitutions
inherently inadequate because the . . . reports, from which the
substitutions were ultimately derived, were unreliable.”37 In
part this was because “it cannot be determined whether the . . .
reports accurately reflect the witnesses’ statements . . . . The
[district] court further commented that the lack of quotation
marks in the . . . reports made it impossible to determine
whether a given statement is a verbatim recording . . . .”38
Responding to the district court’s concerns, the circuit
court stated:
The answer to the concerns of the district court regarding the
accuracy of the [Redacted] reports is that those who are [Redacted]
[ed. interrogating (?)] the witnesses have a profound interest in
obtaining accurate information from the witnesses and in reporting
that information accurately to those who can use it to prevent acts of
terrorism and to capture other al Qaeda operatives. These
considerations provide sufficient indicia of reliability to alleviate the
concerns of the district court.39

In the foregoing passage, the circuit court addressed two
issues: first, whether the information obtained from A, B, and
C was reliable, which it dealt with by stating that the
questioners had “a profound interest in obtaining accurate

35

The district court noted “that it had been impressed with the accuracy of
the summaries.” See id. at 478 n.30 (internal quotation marks omitted).
36
See id. at 478-79.
37
Id. at 478.
38
Id.
39
Id.
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information from the witnesses”;40 and second, the accuracy of
the recording of those statements in the reports, to which it
responded with the statement, “[they] have a profound
interest . . . in reporting that information accurately.”41
Relying on the fact that the interrogators’ motivation
was to obtain accurate statements from A, B, and C for
intelligence purposes (and, implicitly, that they were experts in
this activity) and that the documents recording those
statements were prepared in aid of a similar purpose, the court
concluded that with adequate work by the district court and
the parties, the substitutions could be prepared in a form that
was reliable, and in that form the defendant could introduce
them into evidence. Finally, the court ruled that the defendant
was entitled to have the fact that the substitutions are reliable
communicated to the jury via an appropriate instruction.42
The court did not expressly parse the multiple levels of
hearsay involved in this material, nor did it expressly identify
the hearsay element that presented the greatest challenge to
the court’s overall assessment that the substitutions were
reliable, namely the reliability of the original statements by the
declarants. The court did briefly further address reliability of
this first level, however, when it made the following statement:
To the contrary, we are even more persuaded that the [Redacted]
process is carefully designed to elicit truthful and accurate
43
information from the witnesses.

Here the court seemed to introduce an additional idea to the
argument based upon the government agents’ motivation to
obtain accurate information: the very process [of interrogation
(?)] was carefully designed to obtain truthful and accurate
information.
In discussing the reliability of these out-of-court
statements, the circuit court did not expressly mention the
hearsay rules or discuss the issues in traditional hearsay
terms. This is only somewhat surprising. Although the
substitutions were hearsay and the court was addressing a
traditional hearsay concern—namely, reliability—the court
here was dealing with a compulsory process issue, not a
confrontation/hearsay issue. The evidence sought in this case
40
41
42
43

Id.
Id.
Id. at 478-79.
Id. at 478 n.31.
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was hearsay, in the context, to be introduced by the defendant,
not by the prosecution, and ordinarily a party cannot (and
usually does not) complain about hearsay weaknesses of
evidence that he/she has offered or seeks to introduce. Further,
the opponent of the evidence to be offered, i.e., the prosecutor,
was not likely to raise a hearsay objection because the court’s
approach held promise of resolving the difficult compulsory
process/classified information issues in the case that might
otherwise have turned out to be an obstacle to obtaining a
conviction.
Although it was the defendant who wished to introduce
the evidence in question, he was not totally in control of the
form of the evidence that might be presented. So, this was not a
typical situation in which a party may not be heard to complain
about hearsay that it offered into evidence.
United States v. Paracha involved a similar context and
set of issues and the court relied on the Moussaoui approach in
addressing the matter. Without calling any special attention to
it, the district court in Paracha included in the jury
instructions an additional ground that bore on the
circumstantial reliability of the first level of hearsay in that
case:
The failure [on the part of the witnesses/interrogatees] to provide
truthful information would be detrimental to any relationship to the
44
United States government by the witnesses.

Like the Moussaoui court, the district court in Paracha did not,
however, address the issues raised by these documents in
terms of traditional hearsay categories.
By giving instructions in Moussaoui and Paracha that
the exculpatory45 statements contained in the substitutions
were reliable, both courts figuratively leaned over backwards in
favor of the defendant. Otherwise, absent a resolution of the
impasse, the government might have been faced with the
44

United States v. Paracha, No. 03-CR-1197(SHS), 2006 WL 12768, at *15
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2006). The sentence was probably included in the instructions
because Paracha’s counsel had requested an instruction, which the court rejected, to
the effect that the witnesses/declarants in question were providing assistance to the
U.S. government. See id. at *14 n.2. Instead the court gave the indicated instruction
which on its face seemed to suggest that the witnesses had some special relationship to
the government, which would motivate them to tell the truth.
45
See Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 479-82; Paracha, 2006 WL 12768, at *14-16.
Note that in Moussaoui, the court conceded that not all of the statements in the
substitutions were exculpatory. See Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 473. The government had
argued that a number of the statements in fact incriminated the defendant. See id.
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prospect of a court-imposed sanction dismissing the
prosecution. In assessing the courts’ actions here, it seems fair
to conclude that in each of the cases, the court was trying to be
responsive to the concerns about whether the defendant’s right
to make his defenses would be infringed if neither the
witnesses requested, nor their depositions, were produced.
What is worth emphasizing, however, is not why both
courts did what they did, but rather, what they did. To ensure
that each defendant’s right to defend himself was not infringed,
the courts gave each defendant the benefit of an instruction
that the substitutions and the exculpatory statements
contained therein were obtained under circumstances that
indicated that the statements were reliable.
It is the fact that both courts concluded that a) the
statements were obtained for terrorism intelligence purposes
(“in aid of the pursuit of terrorists and prevention of acts of
terrorism”), and b) that in the circumstances the statements
were reliable, which makes it possible to think about deriving
arguments regarding confrontation and hearsay issues from
these decisions. We discuss these lines of argument in the next
section.
B.

Addressing Possible Confrontation and Hearsay Issues
in a Hypothetical Federal Prosecution of a Gitmo
Detainee
1. A Hypothetical Situation

Suppose that the issue of the admissibility of
Moussaoui-type substitutions were to arise in a future federal
court terrorism prosecution.46 Assume, however, that the
46

In 2009, Attorney General Eric H. Holder (appointed by President Obama),
announced that it had been decided to prosecute some of the Guantanamo detainees in
a federal district court in New York City while others would be prosecuted in military
commission trials under the rules and procedures established by Congress in the
Military Commissions Act of 2006, as amended in 2009. Press Release, U.S.
Department of Justice, Departments of Justice and Defense Announce Forum
Decisions for Ten Guantanamo Bay Detainees (Nov. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/November/09-ag-1224.html.
In the military commission proceedings, the statutory rules for dealing
with hearsay and coerced confessions are different from the rules applied in civilian
courts. (In light of the decision in Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008)
(holding that enemy combatants tried in military commissions could not be deprived
access to the federal writ of habeas corpus), a lurking set of questions is whether and to
what extent specific constitutional protections will be available to detainees being
prosecuted in military commission trials. Specifically, will they be protected by the
Confrontation Clause? If so, the discussion in the text regarding confrontation clause
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substitutions contain statements that incriminate the
defendant and resulted from the interrogation of detainees
whom the government is unable to produce. Assume further
that this time it is the prosecutor who offers the substitutions
containing these statements into evidence against the
defendant.47 Admissible? Are there arguments derived from the
opinions in Moussaoui and Paracha doctrine that can be used
in addressing this issue?
2. Implications of Crawford and Davis for the
Confrontation Issue
To understand the potential significance of the
Moussaoui and Paracha doctrine applied in confrontation and
hearsay contexts, we briefly return to the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Crawford v. Washington and Davis v. Washington.
Recall that Davis qualified Crawford by ruling that not all
statements obtained from police questioning are testimonial.
We quote again from the text, supra, that describes the

issues would be relevant as well to military commission proceedings. Cf. Al-Bihani v.
Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that Confrontation Clause does not
apply in habeas corpus suits, applies only in criminal cases). The discussion in the text
regarding a hypothetical prosecution assumes that it occurs in a federal district court.
Given the impending prosecutions, the issues addressed in the hypothetical situation
could turn out to be not quite so hypothetical.
47
A question may be raised as to whether this hypothetical scenario is
realistic. Is the government likely to attempt to introduce against one of the
Guantanamo detainees on trial for terrorist offenses a statement implicating him
obtained through government interrogation from one of his alleged accomplices?
Attempting to introduce into evidence against a defendant an accomplice’s statement
obtained by the police is not an uncommon practice.
Of course, if the witness/declarant is in government custody, under the
confrontation doctrine applicable in the federal courts, the government would have an
obligation to produce him if he was available, rather than use his hearsay statement.
One can imagine situations, however, in which the witness/declarant is unavailable.
He might, for example, as some terrorist detainees have done, refuse to cooperate with
the proceedings, or he may be unavailable for some other reason.
Whether in a real case, the use of the Moussaoui-type substitutions would
be involved if the government were attempting to offer a detainee’s statement into
evidence might depend on the circumstances. If the detainee-declarant is unavailable,
the government might offer into evidence the fruits of its interrogation of that
individual, which might be in the form of intelligence reports gleaned from
interrogations conducted for intelligence purposes. If these intelligence reports
contained sensitive information, there might be a need to summarize them and prepare
the same kind of substitutions used in the Moussaoui case. On the other hand, if there
were no need to classify information in the report, preparing summaries and
substitutions would not be necessary. Note that at the time, in Moussaoui, the
government was not even willing to admit that it had the witness/declarants in
custody.

1080

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

grounds for distinguishing
nontestimonial statements:

between

[Vol. 75:4

testimonial

and

The distinction rests principally on what was “the primary purpose
of the interrogation.” If the interrogation is “solely directed at
establishing the facts of a past crime, in order to . . .provide evidence
to convict . . . the perpetrator,” it is testimonial. If its primary
purpose was “to meet an ongoing emergency,” or was “designed
primarily . . . to describe current circumstances requiring police
assistance,” it is non-testimonial.48

Given the distinction drawn by Davis, an argument can
be made, based on Moussaoui-Paracha, for addressing the
confrontation concerns posed in our hypothetical situation.
Those two courts indicated that in those cases the purpose of
the interrogation of the suspected terrorists (the ECWs) by
government agents was to provide intelligence to prevent other
catastrophic terrorism events from occurring and to apprehend
other dangerous terrorists. The two cases relied on the fact that
the government interrogators had a purpose other than trying
to obtain evidence to convict the suspected terrorists.
Generally, the existence of such an alternative purpose avoids
many of the concerns that lie behind the Crawford doctrine.
But, as mentioned below, Davis is subject to varying
interpretations. Does the alternative purpose of the
interrogation fall within the specific terms of the Davis
doctrine?
While this alternative purpose may not have involved
an “ongoing emergency,” it is arguable that it was intended to
obtain information regarding “current circumstances requiring
police assistance [action?].” Preventing terrorism events that
may soon happen may not amount to an “ongoing emergency”
of the very immediate type involved in Davis (although even
that point is debatable), but it has some similar characteristics.
Certainly, the government can argue that the purpose of the
interrogation was geared to an urgent need to obtain
information quickly in order to prevent the occurrence of
serious terrorism events that could occur at almost any time. If
the interrogations occurred in the immediate aftermath of 9/11,
the argument would be bolstered. Most importantly, it can be
emphasized that the primary purpose of the interrogation was
not to establish the facts of a past crime.

48

See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
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What is the likelihood that prosecutors in future cases
would be successful in using this application of MoussaouiParacha as a basis for responding to the serious confrontation
concerns posed in our hypothetical situation? It has been
suggested by scholars that Justice Scalia’s opinion in Davis
leaves room for differing interpretations of the kinds of police
questioning that fall under the nontestimonial label; that the
phrases used, such as “primary purpose” and “ongoing
emergency” are “extremely ambiguous” and the ambiguity
enables the judges to manipulate the concepts.49 Some scholars
have focused on the requirement of an ongoing emergency.50
Still others suggest that the Crawford-Davis testimonial test is
“almost arbitrary in its result” and no better than the earlier
reliability approach.51
If the courts were prepared to invoke the Moussaoui
doctrine in this way, they would want to be certain that the
result would not open the door to application of the doctrine in
ordinary criminal prosecution contexts. Suppose, for example,
that in an ordinary prosecution the police claim the purpose of
the interrogation is to discover information that would be
helpful in apprehending one of the defendant’s partners, not to
help convict the defendant. One can imagine that the courts
would formulate some kind of limiting principle(s) to avoid
such a result—e.g., that the alternative purpose must not be ad
hoc but must amount to a sustained and continuing
intelligence-gathering effort, or as in Davis, must be the
“primary purpose.”52 In Davis, the emergency nature of the
situation may also be viewed as the Court’s way of limiting the
49

See Richard D. Friedman, Crawford, Davis and Way Beyond, 15 J.L. &
POL’Y 553, 563 (2007) (describing the potential for unpredictable and unfair rulings
after Davis); see also Myrna S. Raeder, Domestic Violence Cases after Davis: Is the
Glass Half Empty or Half Full? 15 J.L & POL’Y 759, 775-77 (2007).
50
See, e.g., Roger Kirst, Confrontation Rules after Davis v. Washington, 15
J.L. & POL’Y 635. 641-44 (2007). Professor Kirst also details in his article how in the
wake of the Davis decision the Supreme Court disposed of cases applying the Davis
criteria.
51
Raeder, supra note 49, at 776. While ambiguous general terms were used
in the Davis opinion, Justice Scalia did, however, also mention specific facts that can be
argued to limit the scope of application of the doctrine. For example, the fact that the
interrogations took place in a calm setting and the statements were made in response
to a series of questions with the “officer-interrogator taping and making notes of . . .
[the] answers” were mentioned as factors in favor of treating the statements as
testimonial. Davis, 547 U.S. at 827. Invocation of such specific facts from the Davis
situation, would provide a basis for arguing that the Davis exception should not be
applicable in our hypothetical situation. See Raeder, supra note 49, at 775-76.
52
Compare the “significant purpose” standard established for obtaining a
warrant under the FISA statute. Cf. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803, 1804(a)(7)(B) (2006).
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scope of the exception. In our hypothetical, the exigency and
urgency of finding other terrorists before they perpetrate acts
of catastrophic terrorism may be viewed as a similar type of
limitation.53
One might reasonably expect that the rationale of
Moussaoui-Paracha would be invoked by the government to
address the confrontation issue thus raised. While, given the
arguments that can be made on both sides of the testimonialnontestimonial issue, invocation of Moussaoui-Paracha would
not guarantee that the government would prevail, it does
provide a line of plausible, nonfrivolous arguments on the
confrontation issue. In a prosecution of a serious terrorist
defendant, such an argument would have a reasonable chance
of success.
3. Addressing the Hearsay Issues in the Hypothetical
Prosecution
If the government were successful on the confrontation
issue, there would be a further set of questions to consider. As
Justice Scalia wrote in Crawford, “Where nontestimonial
hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers’
design to afford the States flexibility in their development of
hearsay law . . . .”54 If a court were to conclude that the
statements at issue in our hypothetical situation are
nontestimonial under Davis and therefore not inadmissible
under the Confrontation Clause, it would be necessary to
address the question whether the statements are nevertheless
inadmissible under the jurisdiction’s rules governing hearsay.
The hypothetical case assumes a prosecution in a
federal court; accordingly, the Federal Rules of Evidence would
be applicable. Here, too, Moussaoui-Paracha appears to provide
a basis for developing a line of arguments to address the
53

Compare the following: On March 1, 2010, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari on the question:
whether preliminary inquiries of a wounded citizen concerning the
perpetrator and the circumstances of his shooting are nontestimonial because
they were “made under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency,” that emergency including not only aid to a wounded victim, but
also the prompt identification and apprehension of an apparently violent and
dangerous individual?
Michigan v. Bryant, No. 09-150. 2010 WL 680519, at *1 (U.S. Mar. 1, 2010).
54
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67 (2004).
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hearsay issues. We have previously described the several levels
of hearsay involved in the Moussaoui case, and the rationales
articulated by the Fourth Circuit in support of the reliability of
all of those hearsay levels. We also identified the most serious
hearsay weakness in the multiple levels of out-of-court
statements—the fact that the original statements resulting
from the interrogation do not appear to have any special indicia
of reliability. How would the hearsay issues thus raised play
out under the Federal Rules of Evidence?
a. Qualifying Levels 2-4 Under the Federal Rules
In addressing the admissibility of levels 2-4 in our
hypothetical situation, conceivably, the prosecutor might
invoke Federal Rule of Evidence 807, the Residual Exception,
which deals with “[a] statement not specifically covered by Rule
803 or 804, but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness”55 and then rely on the type of arguments made
in Moussaoui regarding the reliability of the documents at
issue there.56
More likely, however, the prosecution would first argue
that all of the levels of hearsay except the first level, i.e., the
interrogatee’s statements, fall under the hearsay exception set
forth in Rule 803(8), Public Records and Reports, which
provides:
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of
public offices or agencies, setting forth . . . (B) matters observed
pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a
duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters
observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel . . .
unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate
lack of trustworthiness.57

Recall that the materials in question in our
hypothetical—i.e., the substitutions—are based upon 1) the
statements made by the interogatee, 2) the recording of those
statements, in direct or indirect form, in reports, 3) the
summaries of those statements and 4) the reorganizing of that
material to make up the final form of the substitutions. An
55

FED. R. EVID. 807.
There are additional requirements in Rule 807, for example, that the
evidence is “more probative on the point than any evidence which the proponent can
reasonably procure,” but we focus here on the equivalent trustworthiness element. Id.
57
FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
56
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argument can plausibly be made that levels 2) to 4) of the
stages in the preparation of these substitutions amount to the
preparation of reports by public officials under a duty to report
within the meaning of Rule 803(8). The key question would
then be whether they fall within the exclusion in that section
applicable to criminal cases, for matters observed by police
officers and other law enforcement personnel.
An often-cited case on the exclusion for police officer
observations is United States v. Quezada58 which addressed the
exclusion clause in the following terms:
While some courts have inflexibly applied the Rule 803(8)(B)
proscription to all law enforcement records in criminal cases, . . . we
are not persuaded that such a narrow application of the rule is
warranted here. The law enforcement exception in Rule 803(8)(B) is
based in part on the presumed unreliability of observations made by
law enforcement officials at the scene of a crime, or in the course of
investigating a crime: ostensibly, the reason for this exclusion is that
observation by police officers at the scene of the crime or the
apprehension of the defendant were not as reliable as observations
by public officials in other cases because of the adversarial nature of
the confrontation between the police and the defendant in criminal
cases.
....
. . . This circuit has recognized that Rule 803(8) is designed to
permit the admission into evidence of public records prepared for
purposes independent of specific litigation. . . . In the case of
documents recording routine, objective observations, made as part of
the everyday function of the preparing official or agency, the factors
likely to cloud the perception of an official engaged in the more
traditional law enforcement functions of observation and
investigation of crime are simply not present. Due to the lack of any
motivation on the part of the recording official to do other than
mechanically register an unambiguous factual matter . . . , such
records are, like other public documents, inherently reliable.59

Quezada thus reasoned that the basis for the exclusion was
that police officer observations at the scene are not reliable
whereas other types of public official observations that have
inherent reliability are not within the exclusion, such as
records prepared for purposes independent of specific
litigation—situations where there is a lack of any motivation

58

754 F.2d 1190 (5th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1193-94 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
59
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on the part of the official to do other than mechanically register
unambiguous factual matters.
It is arguable that the Moussaoui alternative purpose—
the motivation to obtain accurate intelligence that could be
acted upon by agents in the field in order to prevent future
terrorist actions, not to gather evidence to be used in
litigation—provides comparable grounds for concluding that
the recordings and reports of the statements contained in the
substitutions are “inherently reliable.”
Thus, some of the same arguments for treating the
substitutions as nontestimonial under the Crawford
confrontation doctrine, can be invoked to support qualifying all
but the first level of hearsay in the substitutions under Rule
803(8) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and for not applying
the criminal case/matters-observed-by-police exclusion in that
rule.
However, the ultimate admissibility of levels 2-4 is
dependent under Rule 803(8) on whether “the sources of
information . . . indicate a lack of trustworthiness.”60 If the
statements made by the detainee-declarants as summarized in
the substitutions are deemed unreliable and “indicate a lack of
trustworthiness,” nothing of the substitutions—that is, levels
2-4—is admissible.61

60

FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
The Moussaoui arguments discussed in the text up to this point can be
offered in support of the reliability of the reporting, summarizing and recordings
actions of the government agents and to respond to any questions raised with respect to
levels 2-4 under the last clause of Rule 803(8), “unless the sources of information or
other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness,” FED. R. EVID. 803(8), but the
question of the reliability of the first level statements remains and must be separately
treated.
In Crawford, Justice Scalia stated that business records, which are
analogous to public records are “by their nature . . . not testimonial.” Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004); see also, e.g., United States v. Rueda-Rivera, 396
F.3d 678, 680 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (holding items in an immigration file akin to
business records are non-testimonial in nature).
Regarding the question of whether the business records exception in the
FED. R. EVID. 803(6), Records of Regularly Conducted Activity, which does not have a
criminal case/matters-observed-by-police exclusion might be used in lieu of FED. R.
EVID. 803(8), see United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 78 (2d Cir. 1977). Numerous
cases have interpreted and limited Oates. These authorities are collected in JACK B.
WEINSTEIN, JOHN H. MANSFIELD, NORMAN ABRAMS, MARGARET A. BERGER,
EVIDENCE—CASES AND MATERIALS 710-14 (9th ed. 1997).
61
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b. Can the Interrogatees’ Statements (Level 1) Be
Qualified Under the Federal Rules?
i. Intrinsic Circumstantial Reliability
As previously mentioned, the first level of hearsay, the
interrogatee’s statements to the government agents in response
to questioning, presents the most problematic of the hearsay
issues raised in the hypothetical situation.
The hearsay issue thus posed falls within the general
category of a declarant’s statements resulting from police
interrogation being offered into evidence by the prosecution in
the trial of his alleged accomplice. Efforts have often been
made in the past, relying on the declaration against penal
interest exception, to introduce such statements into evidence.
It has been argued that such statements have intrinsic
reliability that comes from being against the penal interest of
the declarant. The asserted “against interest” features of a
statement that inculpates a co-conspirator are, however, a
complicated subject that has been addressed by scholars62; and
the Supreme Court, in a series of cases culminating in Lilly v.
Virginia,63 usually ruled against the admissibility of such
statements.
Conceivably, there might be some other type of special
circumstances that would be suggestive of intrinsic
circumstantial reliability of interrogation statements. A
possible example of such a special circumstance might be the
kind of facts underlying the aforementioned instruction given
in the Paracha case, which suggested that the declarants had a
motive to tell the truth arising out of the fact that they had
developed a relationship with the government interrogators
which they were interested in maintaining.64 The implication
was that to lie to the interrogators would put that relationship
at risk.

62

See generally, e.g., Daniel J. Capra, Essay, Amending the Hearsay
Exception for Declarations Against Penal Interest in the Wake of Crawford, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 2409 (2005); John G. Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant Accomplice, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1797 (2001); Sarah D. Heisler, My Brother, My Witness Against Me:
The Constitutionality of the “Against Penal Interest” Hearsay Exception in
Confrontation Clause Analysis, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827 (2000); Roger W.
Kirst, Appellate Court Answers to the Confrontation Questions in Lilly v. Virginia, 53
SYRACUSE L. REV. 87 (2003).
63
527 U.S. 116, 116-17 (1999).
64
See supra note 44, and accompanying text.
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This type of rationale is a weak ground for a claim of
circumstantial reliability. Would it mean, for example, that the
hearsay statements of an informer who works regularly with
the police should be viewed as having intrinsic reliability
because of his desire to maintain the relationship and whatever
benefits accrue to him therefrom?
Whatever the merits of this specific type of claim, the
Paracha instruction is an example of a claim of reliability
based upon specific facts for a hearsay statement that does not
fall under a specific exception. To be independently qualified,
the statement would have to meet the standards of Rule 807,
the Residual Exception, that is, circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness equivalent to those under Rule 803 or 804.65
We also learn from Lilly v. Virginia, however, (which
was decided under pre-Crawford confrontation-trustworthiness
standards), that under the then-applicable constitutional
doctrine,
the
requirements
for
meeting
residual
trustworthiness standards in a case involving accomplice
hearsay resulting from government interrogation and
inculpating a criminal defendant are likely to be very difficult
to meet:
It is clear that our cases consistently have viewed an accomplice’s
statements that shift or spread the blame to a criminal defendant as
falling outside the realm of those “hearsay exception[s] [that are] so
trustworthy that adversarial testing can be expected to add little to
[the statements’] reliability.” . . . The decisive fact, which we make
explicit today, is that accomplices’ confessions that inculpate a
criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the
hearsay rule as that concept has been defined in our Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence.
....
The residual “trustworthiness” test credits the axiom that a
rigid application of the Clause’s standard for admissibility might in
an exceptional case exclude a statement of an unavailable witness
that is incontestably probative, competent, and reliable, yet
nonetheless outside of any firmly rooted hearsay exception . . . .
When a court can be confident—as in the context of hearsay falling
within a firmly rooted exception—that “the declarant’s truthfulness
is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of crossexamination would be of marginal utility,” the Sixth Amendment’s

65

The claim of reliability would also be relevant to the issue regarding levels
2-4 under FED. R. EVID. 803(8) applying the clause, “unless the sources of
information . . . indicate lack of trustworthiness.” See supra notes 60-61 and
accompanying text.
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residual “trustworthiness” test allows the admission of the
declarant’s statements.
....
It is highly unlikely that the presumptive unreliability that
attaches to accomplices’ confessions that shift or spread blame can
be effectively rebutted when the statements are given under
conditions that implicate the core concerns of the old ex parte
affidavit practice—that is, when the government is involved in the
statements’ production, and when the statements describe past
events and have not been subjected to adversarial testing.66

Although the Court’s expressed view of the
“presumptive unreliability that attaches to accomplices’
confessions that shift or spread blame,” was written in a
setting involving a constitutional issue under pre-Crawford
standards, it would seem to bear generally on questions
regarding the unreliability of such statements. It suggests that
invocation of the Moussaoui-Paracha rationale based on a
claim of intrinsic reliability because of special circumstances
relating to the declarant’s statements would be faced with a
strong presumption of unreliability.
ii. Extrinsic Circumstantial Reliability
A closer examination is also warranted of the specific
elements underlying the Moussaoui court’s conclusion that the
first level statements are sufficiently reliable based on extrinsic
factors, that is, not arising from the intrinsic nature and
content of the statement or motive of the declarant, but rather
from the motivation and methods of the government agents
who obtained the statements from the ECWs. The question is
whether these factors, which were relied upon by the court in
Moussaoui, are sufficient to establish circumstantial
trustworthiness for purposes of Rule 807.67
The motivation and methods argument advanced by the
court in Moussaoui can be broken down into three parts. The
first part takes the following form: Ordinary police
interrogators are motivated to obtain convictions—whether of
66

Lilly, 527 U.S. at 133-34, 136-37 (alterations in original) (citations

omitted).
67

That is, whether the motivation of the interrogators to obtain accurate
information (plus the implied appeal to the expertise of the interrogators) and the fact
that the process of interrogation is “well designed” for such a purpose, are in
combination sufficient circumstantial guarantees of the reliability of the statements.
See FED. R. EVID. 807.
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the person being interrogated or other persons. That
motivation may shape how they question and the direction of
their questioning. Government intelligence agents, such as
those who interrogated the ECWs, are motivated to find other
terrorists and prevent terrorist actions. They need completely
accurate information for this purpose. They have no motivation
to shape the direction of the information they obtain other than
in ways designed to ensure that totally accurate information is
obtained that will help them find terrorists and prevent acts of
terror. However, it is a long leap to conclude that, because the
interrogators are motivated to obtain accurate information they
do indeed obtain accurate information from the persons whom
they have interrogated.68
The second part of the argument which can be inferred
from the Moussaoui opinion assumes that the interrogators
have special expertise. What kind of expertise? We assume the
claim is that the interrogators are persons of high intelligence,
sensitivity and psychological insight who are able to make
judgments about people, the logic of their stories, and to
discern factual inconsistencies and flaws in the stories being
told; that they also have the ability to make judgments about
personalities,
mannerisms,
candor,
dissembling,
disingenuousness and the like, that make them specially
capable of distinguishing truth-telling from false stories or

68

There is a different tack that might be taken in addressing the Moussaoui
court’s conclusion that the statements of the ECWs were reliable—namely, introducing
nonhearsay evidence regarding the reliability of the statements in an effort to meet the
reliability threshold of FED. R. EVID. 807. The court’s comments suggested that the
government agents viewed these statements as reliable; the implication was also that
the government used and acted upon the information from the ECWs in the work done
by government agents in the field to apprehend terrorists and prevent acts of
terrorism. Suppose the question is whether testimony regarding such government
actions should be admissible to prove the reliability of the statements made by the
ECWs—that is, offering the government’s actions to prove the belief of the government
to prove the existence of that fact believed, i.e. the reliability of the statements. That
tack is similar to what was done in the classic English evidence-hearsay case, Wright v.
Tatham, (1837) 112 Eng. Rep. 488, 494-95 (Exch. Ch.). In that case, of course, a
number of the justices concluded that the evidence in question was hearsay. Id. at 51617. The definition of hearsay used in the Federal Rules of Evidence, however, excludes
“from the operation of the hearsay rule all evidence of conduct, verbal or nonverbal, not
intended as an assertion.” FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee’s note. Accordingly,
the actions of the government in this regard would not be treated as hearsay under the
Federal Rules. Cf. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200 cmt. (West 2009) (“[T]here is frequently a
guarantee of the trustworthiness of the inference to be drawn from . . . nonassertive
conduct because the actor has based his actions on the correctness of his belief, i.e., his
actions speak louder than words.”).
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stories that have some falsity in them.69 Most judges are likely
to be skeptical about such claims of expertise, especially about
whether they are strong enough to support a finding of
reliability.
The third part of the argument is that the process of
questioning is “well designed” to obtain accurate information.
What was the court referring to here? At the time, the
government was not willing to acknowledge that it had the
suspects in custody or that it had been interrogating them.
Accordingly, there was no need to specify the methods used in
interrogating them. We assume, however, that if special
methods were being used in such interrogations, the
government would try to keep the methods confidential and
protected by the mantle of classified information. So we are
faced with a factual claim that we are not able to assess
because the facts relating to it are not available or likely to
become available. Of course, such facts might be made
available to the court in camera, and the court would be able to
make a judgment (as the Moussaoui court apparently did) as to
whether the nature of the process of interrogation assured that
the statements obtained were sufficiently reliable.
In the absence of more specific information, we can only
make some very general and highly speculative observations
about what might be the design of a process of interrogation
that would assure sufficient reliability. If the process involved
the use of any form of coercion, apart from the due process and
related claims that might be raised, the very use of coercion
would tend to cast doubt on the reliability of the statements
made. Or suppose the process involved the use of lie detectors,
and that is the basis for the court’s judgment of sufficient
reliability? Again, a Pandora’s Box of issues would be opened
by such a claim. Suppose that drugs were used in interrogating
the suspects? Again, due process issues would arise out of such
a process. Or suppose that the government used some type of
special psychological or other techniques, not involving any
prohibited coercion, in eliciting the statements from the
suspects?70
69

The assumption thus seems to be that the persons who conduct the CIA
(and other similar agencies) interrogations of terrorist suspects are much better at
their job than police who conduct ordinary crime interrogations. We do not have
enough information to make a judgment about the validity of such a claim.
70
See Steven Kleinman and Matthew Alexander, Op-Ed, Try a Little
Tenderness, N.Y. TIMES, March 11, 2009, at A31. The authors of this article describe
themselves as “military interrogators” who have questioned “hundreds of prisoners”
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It is impossible to evaluate the soundness of a claim of
sufficient circumstantial reliability without knowing the
specific facts underlying the claim. Accordingly, the ultimate
resolution of the claim of sufficient reliability based on the
methods of interrogation must here be left hanging in the air.
It would be very troubling, however, if in connection with such
an issue classified information is provided to the judge
regarding the interrogation techniques used—information not
available to the public—and the judge bases a ruling in favor of
admissibility on such information.71
The arguments advanced in Moussaoui and Paracha for
the circumstantial reliability of the first hearsay level of
interrogation statements—whether grounded in intrinsic or
extrinsic grounds—do not appear to be strong enough to
warrant admissibility under the Federal Rules, neither under a
specific exception nor under the residual exception of Rule 807.
Claims that the purpose of the interrogations is to obtain
intelligence and that the questioners’ motivation, expertise and
methods enable them to obtain truthful information and gauge
when it is truthful—though interesting and creative—do not in
the end seem to be logically strong enough or to be supported
by sufficient factual information to overcome the “presumptive
unreliability that attaches to accomplices’ confessions that shift
or spread blame . . . when the government is involved in the
statements’ production, and when the statements describe past
events and have not been subjected to adversarial testing.”72
V.

CONCLUSION

The rationale articulated by the judges in MoussaouiParacha provides the government with a line of arguments to
and detainees and “supervised thousands of other interrogations.” Id. They describe a
technique that they have used successfully that involves building a relationship with
the person being interrogated—one based on trust, using an approach that requires
familiarity with the detainee’s language and culture and involves a study of each
prisoner’s case and then uses charisma and empathy to elicit intelligence. See id. They
also propose a scientific approach to improving interrogation techniques and the
establishment of a research center that would establish “a clear and stringent standard
of conduct and ethics and build[] a cadre of skilled interrogators.” Id.
71
A serious classified information-making one’s defenses question would
arise: Suppose the court concludes, based upon classified information about the
interrogation process, that that process is well designed to ensure sufficient reliability.
Suppose also, however, that the court denies access by the defendant to this classified
information and the defendant is therefore unable to respond to and argue against that
conclusion. Has not the defendant been denied the right to make his defenses?
72
Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137 (1999).
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use in federal court terrorism prosecutions when offering into
evidence hearsay statements, which are obtained by the
government through questioning for intelligence purposes and
which incriminate the defendant. More specifically, it suggests
a pathway to explore confrontation-testimonial concerns and
reliability-hearsay issues under the Federal Rules in regard to
statements obtained from subsequently unavailable declarants.
The weakest link in the argument involves the
application of the rationale to the admissibility question at the
first level of hearsay—that is, the admissibility of the actual
statements made by the interrogatee. The arguments that the
substitutions are nontestimonial under Crawford and Davis
and that all but the first level of hearsay in the
reports/summaries/substitutions meet the standards of Rule
803(8), while certainly far from conclusive, have a reasonable
chance of being successful.73
While the suggested arguments that the government
might make regarding the first level hearsay issue are creative,
it seems unlikely that in a normal trial setting the government
would (or should) prevail on that issue.74 The court’s
argument—that the statements made by the interrogatees
have circumstantial reliability because the government
interrogators had a strong motivation to obtain accurate
information or because the process of interrogation was “well
designed” to produce accurate information—runs directly
counter to traditional judicial concerns about the risks that
arise from government interrogations, as reflected both in
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Crawford as well as Professor
Berger’s views in her 1992 law review article.
The Moussaoui reliability assertions were made in a
compulsory process setting. There may be doubts whether even
in that setting it should be permissible to attribute reliability
to statements that do not have sufficient indicia of
73

But success here does not coincide with admissibility. Under FED. R. EVID.
803(8), unless the sources have sufficient trustworthiness, the evidence does not come
in. See FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
74
However, the same type of background concerns that may have influenced
the Moussaoui and Paracha courts to articulate and then apply a reliability rationale
in a compulsory process context—that is, concerns about releasing dangerous
terrorists—are likely also to be present in future terrorism prosecutions. Potentially,
these same kinds of concerns may exert some influence on judges, leading them to take
advantage of the type of doctrinal lifeline that Moussaoui-Paracha might be seen as
providing regarding confrontation/hearsay issues. Accordingly, it would be foolish to
make a firm prediction that the government would be unlikely to succeed on these
issues in future terrorism trials in the federal courts.
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circumstantial reliability. Be that as it may, we should not be
misled by reliability attributions made in a compulsory process
setting to conclude that such statements should necessarily be
admissible under hearsay rules against a criminal defendant.75
It is noteworthy that, in the end, the hearsay
statements at issue are most likely to founder not on
confrontation grounds as reflected in Crawford and Davis, but
rather on old-fashioned reliability concerns, as now only
reflected in federal and state rules of evidence. The message is
that while Crawford and Davis set up an additional barrier to
admissibility framed in terms of the testimonial-nontestimonial
distinction, a reliability standard also continues to be
applicable, based not in the Constitution but on the rules of
evidence.76

75

See Peter Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified theory
of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REV. 567, 627 n.167 (1978) (concluding
that in determining whether exculpatory evidence has sufficient assurances of
reliability to be admissible under compulsory process doctrine one should refer as a
benchmark to whether incriminating evidence “would be deemed to possess sufficient
‘indicia of reliability’ to be admissible against the defendant under the due process
clause” (citations omitted)).
Professor Westen thus reasons from the reliability of incriminating
evidence to the reliability of compulsory process-exculpatory admissible evidence. The
issue posed by our hypothetical situation is the reverse: the question is whether
sufficient reliability for admissibility of compulsory process exculpatory evidence
should therefore be deemed sufficient reliability to make the evidence admissible
where it is incriminatory of the defendant and raises confrontation-hearsay issues. At
other places in the article, Professor Westen seems to indicate that the standards of
admissibility under both the Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses should be
the same. See id. at 601 (“[T]he principles of confrontation and compulsory process are
substantially identical . . . . While the prosecution is under a further obligation to
present its evidence in reliable form, it is compelled to do so not by the confrontation
clause but by the due process clause.”); see also id. at 598 (“The due process clause
prohibits the state . . . from using any single item of evidence against a defendant
which is inherently too unreliable for rational evaluation by the jury.”).
76
See Tom Cummins, Comment, Danforth v. Minnesota: The Confrontation
Clause, Retroactivity, and Federalism, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 255, 271-72 (2009).

